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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1953 as amended) wherein the Court is granted jurisdiction in appeals
from a court of record in criminal cases.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Appellant Failed to Preserve the Issues Raised in His Appeal By
Failing to Properly Raise the Issues Before the Trial Court. Issues of law are reviewed
under a correctness standard, State v. Maquire, 995 P.2d 476 (UT. App. 1999).

2. Whether, Given the Totality of the Evidence, the Trial Court Correctly Concluded
There Was Sufficient Evidence to Convict the Defendant of Battery. Issues involving
the factual findings of the Trial Court are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous
standard," State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992) and error exists "only if the
factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record."
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
3. Whether any error over the alleged discovery violation was harmless where the
Appellant failed to request relief under Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure or demonstrate that without the alleged error there was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant? Issues of alleged discovery

l

violations are reviewed for abuse of discretion.. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah
1987).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions relevant to the
determination of this matter are set forth in the Addendum:
Rule 16 ofthe Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.08.020, Battery

STATEMENT OF CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about February 12, 2001, Defendant/Appellant Thomas James Taylor,
(hereinafter "Appellant",) was charged with Assault with Substantial Bodily Injury, a
Class A misdemeanor having occurred on December 20, 2000 in Salt Lake City, in
violation ofthe Utah Code Section 75-5-102(3)(a). Record (hereinafter "R.") 1. On May
9, 2002, Salt Lake City filed an Amended Information Charging the Defendant with
Battery, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Section 11.08.020 ofthe Salt Lake City
Code. R. 49. On May 10, 2002 the matter came on for hearing before the Honorable
Dennis M. Fuchs for a jury trial, which by stipulation ofthe parties was converted to a
bench trial. R. 52.
Appellee called three witnesses, the victim, Michael Breck, Josh Braithwaite and
Officer Arslanian with the Salt Lake City Police Department. R. 52. Appellee first called
Michael Breck. Record 62, Trial Transcript Page 5 (hereinafter T.T.) Mr. Breck testified
2

that on December 20, 2000 he was working as a utility locator for One Call Locating,
locating gas lines for Questar Gas by tracing out the lines and putting paint marks down
on streets, curbs and sidewalks to indicate the presence of gas lines. T.T. 6 . He testified
that on this date he was working in the area of 200 South and 600 West in Salt Lake City
and that on the southeast corner of that intersection, there is a building known as "Bricks"
where the witness was locating a gas line. T.T. 6. Mr. Breck began using a paint marker
to mark out the gas lines at this location. T.T. 9-10. At some point he questioned the
accuracy of his work and after rechecking began to erase the original markings he had
made with his foot and make new markings based on his recalculations. T.T. 9-11. At
that time, the Appellant approached Mr. Breck and asked him what he was doing and Mr.
Breck informed the appellant he was a locating a gas line for Questar. T.T. 11.

A

conversation between the two ensued during which time Mr. Breck described the
Appellant as "kind of aggressive." T.T. 11-12. The Appellant became concerned about
the original marks Mr. Breck was erasing and ordered him off the property which
Appellant believed to be his property and which Mr. Breck believe to be on the public
right of way. T.T. 12. At this point the witness described the Appellant as being very
angry "and I didn't understand exactly why, and I just continued trying to do my job."
T.T. 12. Mr. Breck continued to mark the gas line while marking off steps such that all
his weight ended on his left leg, when he was grabbed by the left shoulder and twisted
around, then grabbed by the right shoulder and forced into the road by the Appellant.
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T.T. 12. He described the pushes as "extremely violent" making it hard for him to keep
his balance. T.T. 14-15. Mr. Breck had a stick for locating utilities in one hand and a
stick with a paint can for marking the utilities in the other throughout the confrontation.
T.T. 9-15. A witness to the assault, who was later identified as Mr. Braithwaite, stopped
and assisted Mr. Breck. T.T. 15-16. As a result of the battery Mr. Breck suffered a
sore back and a numb right leg. T.T. 16-17.
During the cross-examination of Mr. Breck by Appellant's attorney it was
determined that Mr. Breck had asked Mr. Braithwaite to write down his observations of
the incident. T.T. 21. This written statement of Mr. Braithwaite5s was provided by Mr.
Breck to the Prosecutor shortly before trial. T.T. 22, 98. Mr. Breck had told the
Prosecutor that a copy of the statement had been provided to Appellant as part of
discovery in a pending civil suit. T.T. 22. The trial court took a recess to allow attorney
for Appellant an opportunity to receive a copy of the statement and review it. T.T. 22.
The trial judge stated that after the recess Appellant could determine whether he wished
"to proceed with trial today or you want to take a break." T.T. 22. After the recess, the
Appellant did not request a continuance or any other relief related to the unexpected
witness statement, but proceeded with trial. T.T. 22-23.
Joshua Braithwaite testified that he was working for Salt Lake City Public Utilities
on December 20, 2000 and driving in the area of 200 South and 600 West in Salt Lake
City when he saw the victim "getting shoved around by some guy." T.T. 24-25. He
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described the shoving as "real fierce and hard." T.T. 26. He indicated that Appellant was
the man he saw shoving the victim. T.T. 27. He stopped his vehicle and ran over to see if
his assistance was needed. T.T. 27. He described the victim Mr. Breck as being "pale,
light in the face" and "obviously going through a bit of pain." Mr. Braithwaite could not
determine whether or not the Appellant's hands were continuously on the victim Mr.
Breck or not. T.T. 37. Attorney for Appellant used the prior written statement in his
cross-examination of Mr. Braithwaite. T.T. 30 -34. Appellant admitted the statement
into evidence. T.T. 31.
Officer Aaron Arslanian with the Salt Lake City Police Department testified that he
responded to the scene. T.T. 38-39. He interviewed Mr. Breck whose demeanor he
characterized as "subdued, quiet." He spoke to appellant whose demeanor he
characterized as "excited" and "animated." T.T. 41. Appellant told Officer Arslanian
that an physical altercation occurred when he put his hands up to defend himself and Mr.
Breck walked into his hands. T.T. 42.
Appellant called three witnesses, Gary Holstein, Patrick Nelligan and himself. T.T.
52-53.
Gary Holstein testified that he is employed as an officer Manager for Bricks which
is owned by the Defendant. T.T. 45-46, 52. On December 20, 2000 he was in the office
working. T.T. 46. The office has several surveillance monitors. T.T. 46. He heard
arguing outside and looked at the monitor which looks out onto the street. T.T. 47. He
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observed on the monitor an individual "rushing" the Appellant. T.T. 48. He saw the
appellant put his hands up and the other individual run into them. T.T. 49. He also
testified that he saw Appellant touch Mr. Breck in the upper arm and that it appeared that
Appellant was trying to "redirect" Mr. Breck. T.T. 65-66. Mr. Holstein testified that he
left his office to go to the office next door which had windows overlooking the street
where the argument was taking place. T.T. 61-62. He testified "there was more of the
incident than what I viewed", T.T. 62 and that there was approximately a minute where
something may have occurred which he did not see. T.T. 61.
Mr. Nelligan testified that he is a driver for American Linen and was making a
delivery to Bricks on December 20, 2002 when he heard an argument between Mr. Breck
and the Appellant. TT. 75. He testified that they both seemed to be using vulgarities
toward each other. T.T. 75. He stayed inside his van and then went inside Brick's to
make his delivery and did not witness a physical confrontation. T.T. 75. He testified that
he purposefully avoided watching the incident because he did not want to get involved.
T.T. 80-81.
Appellant testified that on December 20, 2000 he encountered Mr. Breck erasing
marks used to mark utilities. T.T. 85-87. An argument ensued. T.T. 86-87. Mr. Breck
"came at him", T.T. 87, and he put his hands up in a defensive position and Mr. Breck ran
into his hands. T.T. 88-89.

At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial Judge found Appellant guilty of
Battery a Class B. misdemeanor. TT 112. In making his ruling the trial judge stated that
he found the testimony of Appellant and Mr. Breck to be biased. T.T. 108. He found the
other witnesses to be unbiased but that Mr. Holstein and Mr. Nelligan were not in a
position to have witnessed the entire incident. T.T. 109-110. His verdict was based
"strongly" on the testimony of Mr. Braithwaite. T.T. 112.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on June 7, 2002. R. 56.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant failed to properly raise the issues raised now on appeal before the trial
court and therefore failed to preserve them for appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has held
that the doctrine of waiver has application if defendants fail to raise claims at the
appropriate time at the trial level, so the trial judge has an opportunity to rule on the issue
or if they do not create an adequate record for an appellate court to review their claims."
State v. Emrnett, 839 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court further
held in State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 351 (Utah 2000), that the preservation rule applies
to every claim unless a defendant can demonstrate that "exceptional circumstances" exist
or "plain error" occurred, which Appellant has failed to do.
Appellant failed to marshal the evidence and can therefore not challenge its
sufficiency. In order to attack the sufficiency of the evidence Appellant must first
"present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
7

introduced at trial [that] supports the very findings [it] resists." State v. Waldron, 51 P.3d
21, 23 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co,, 818 P.2d
1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This Appellant has failed to do. His failure to marshal
the evidence should result in the affirmation of the trial court's verdict. State v. Waldron,
51 P.3d 21, 23 (Utah. Ct. App. 2002).
The Trial Court's determination of the Appellant's guilt was not based on
speculation but supported by the totality of the evidence received. The Utah Supreme
Court has held that verdict should be reversed only when, after viewing the evidence and
all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, a finding is made
that "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Heaps,
999 P2d. 565 (Utah 2000). Appellant has failed to demonstrate as required that given the
totality of the evidence, the verdict is "plainly unreasonable and unjust."
Appellant cannot claim error for an alleged discovering violation when he failed to
request appropriate relief under Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
After discovering the existence of the prior written statement of witness Braithwaite, the
Appellant neither requested a continuance or other means of relief available under Rule
16(g). He therefore waived his right to claim error.
The fact that the Defendant was not provided a copy of the witness statement prior
to trial was harmless. The Utah Supreme Court has held that discovery errors warrant
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reversal only if "a review" of the record persuades the court that without the error, there
was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant." State v Knight,

attorney cross-examined the witness using the statement pro\ ided, and admitted the
statement into evidence. He did not request a continuance or indicate more time was
needed to deal with the unexpected statement Appellant has failed to show as required
111 ill llilintf1 is a in iisoiulik1 lil.cliliunil (ill i m Mill IIIIOII; \i\\ nidhh1 !u I he 1 )e feudal ill il lin
witness statement had been provided sooner. Id.
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appropriate time at the trial level, so the trial judge has an opportunity to rule on the issue
or if they do not create an adequate record for an appellate court to review their claims."
State v. EmmetU 839 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Utah 1992).
Appellant alleges there was insufficient evidence to support the trial judge's
determination of guilt in this case. In State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 351 (Utah 2000), the
Utah Supreme Court held "[A] defendant must raise the sufficiency of the evidence by
proper motion or objection to preserve the issue for appeal." The preservation rule
applies to every claim unless a defendant can demonstrate that "exceptional
circumstances" exist or "plain error" occurred. Id. Appellant failed to raise the
sufficiency of evidence with the court during or after the trial. By failing to ever raise the
issue of the sufficiency of the evidence with the trial court, Appellant failed to preserve
the issue for appeal.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Holgate, this Court held in State v. Larsen, 99
P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) that the preservation rule did not apply where Larsen had
been convicted at a bench trial. The Supreme Court in Holgate did not address the
Larsen ruling because Holgate dealt with a conviction by a jury. However, the Supreme
Court did state in Holgate that the preservation rule applies to every claim unless
Appellant demonstrates exceptional circumstances or plain error. Holgate, 351.
Appellant has failed to do either.
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Further Rule 24(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that
Appellant either cite to the record for each issue presented showing where it was
preserved in the trial court, or include a statement of the ground:* lor seeking u^ K * i -r

In order for the Appellant to appeal an issue, the issue must first be raised with the
trial court \ p pellant failed to properly preserve these issues for appeal.

II.

APPELLANT FAILED I O M A R S H A L I HE EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED
BEFORE HE CAN MAKE AN CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT HIS CONVICTION

Appellam lailed to marshal the evidence and can therefore not challenge its
si ifficiencj
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marshal the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and then demonstrate that
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failed to do. Appellant's brief addresses only part of the evidence presented at trial,
11

which limited evidence he then attempts to refute. Appellant fails to address all the
evidence presented at trial and fails to marshal the evidence in a light most favorable to
the verdict as required. His failure to marshal the evidence should result in the
affirmation of the trial court's verdict. State v. Waldron, 51 P.3d 21, 23 (Utah. Ct. App.
2002).
III.

BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE, THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF BATTERY
The Trial Court's determination of the Appellant's guilt was not based on

speculation but supported by the totality of the evidence received. The ability of an
appellant court to review a review a verdict on the grounds of insufficient evidence is
limited. State v. Pearson, 985 P.2d 919 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). The Utah Supreme Court
has held that verdict should be reversed only when, after viewing the evidence and all
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, a finding is made that
"the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Heaps,
999 P2d. 565 (Utah 2000) (dealing with a jury verdict). This Court has held that the trier
of fact is entitled "to use [his] own judgment on what evidence to believe and may draw
reasonable inferences from that evidence. State v. Pearson, 985 P. 2d 919 (Utah Court
App. 1999).
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In the present case the Appellant was charged with Battery in violation of Salt
Lake City Code 11,08.020, which states that a person is guilty of Battery who uses
""unlawful force or violence upon the person of anotht-
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IV.

BY FAILING I'O REQUEST APPROPRIATE RELIEF UNDER RULE 16(g)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, APPELLANT
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CI AIM ERROR,

Appellant waived his right to claim error by failing to exhaust relief available for
alleged discovery violations under Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure provides relief for discovery
violations, including granting a continuance. The Utah Supreme Court has held that
failing to exhaust remedies available under Rule 16(g) essentially waives a defendant's
right to later claim error. State v. Larsen, 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989). In State v.
Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court held that by failing to
move for a continuance "defendant waived relief under rule 16(g)... by not making
timely efforts to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice . . . . " This court has similarly held
that dismissal of a case was inappropriate where the defendant failed to exhaust Rule
16(g) remedies, such as requesting a continuance. State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944,
948 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
This court addressed a similar issue in State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998), where evidence was introduced through a expert witness, the substance of
which was contrary to the information provided pursuant to a request for discovery. In
Rugebregt, this court held that because the defendant had failed to request a continuance
or "devise any means of dealing with [the] . . . unexpected testimony," the defendant
waived his right to challenge to the surprise evidence. Id. at 522.
Similarly in this case, Appellant failed to request a continuance or request any
relief available under Rule 16(g) to deal with the unexpected witness statement. After
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discovering the a witness statement existed, a copy was provided to the Appellant and the
court took a recess saying that after the recess to review the statement, the appellant could

having been provided a cop;; ,r of the statement and having been given ai 1 oppoi tin in;it;; > I: :
review it and proceeded with trial. The Appellant was able to cross examine the w itness
using the witness statement and in fact Appellant admitted that witness statement into

j l i m | 0 a c j ( j r e s s t | i e w j t n e s s statement. Therefore, Appellant waived his right to claim
error.
V.

THERE IS NOT A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE VERDICT
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IF THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN
PROVIDED A COPY OF THE WITNESS STATEMENT PRIOR ^ 0
TRIAI
The fact that the Defendant was not provided a copy of the witness statement prior

to trial in no way affected the outcome of the trial.
1
t
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mitigate the guilt of the Defendant or mitigate the degree of the offense. However, even
if there was a duty to disclose the witness statement prior to trial, any error committed

only if "a review of the record persuades the court that without the error, there was a
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reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant. State v. Knight, 734
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).
Here the record indicates that at some point shortly before trial the Prosecutor was
given by the victim Mr. Breck a written witness statement of witness Joshua Braithwaite.
The Court took a recess and allowed the attorney for Appellant an opportunity to review
the statement. The Court indicated that after the break to review the statement, the
appellant could "proceed with trial today or take a break."
After reviewing the witness statement, the Appellant's attorney cross-examined the
witness using the statement provided, and admitted the statement into evidence. He did
not request a continuance or indicate more time was needed to deal with the unexpected
statement. The content of the witness statement at issue and any affect it may have had
on the credibility of Appellee's witness Mr. Braithwaite was known to the trial court prior
to rendering a verdict. Appellant has failed to show as required that there is a reasonable
likelihood of a result more favorable to the Defendant if the witness statement had been
provided sooner. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff/Appellee respecikuiv requests that ;;;is court uiinni Hi*, dec isU''i!
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13in day of January 2003
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.nt QitW Prosecutor
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed or delivered two true and correct copies of
tin

the foregoing Brief of the Appellant on this 13 day of January 2003 to:
F. KEVIN BOND
BUDGE W. CALL
Bond & Call L.C.
Attorneys for Defendant /Appellant
213 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

18

MM SDI M

19

Exhibit A
11.08.020 Battery.
A battery is any wilful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. It is
unlawful for any person to commit a battery within the limits of the city. (Prior code § 32-1-3)
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 16

(4) If the court orders that the testimony of a child be taken under
cibsection (2) or (3), the child may not be required to testify m court at any
roceedin^ where the recorded testimony is used.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
^plication
2Sflpfcancc *
other provisions
<>flStrurtion
^proper admission
Application.
rtfestiffiony of child witness by closed circuit
television was appropriately permitted where
the evaluator testified that the child's testimony would degrade, that she would be less
responsive, and that she would suffer emotiw&l stress lasting for a few days or weeks if
required to testify in defendant's presence
gfctev Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, 397 Utah
Adv. Rep 16
Compliance with other provisions.
Normally, the trial court must comply with
{^requirements of both this rule and § 76-5411 when considering videotaped out-of-court
statements of child victims of sexual abuse
State v, Lamper 779 P2d 1125 (Utah 1989)
Because ^ 76-5-411 explicitly incorporates
Subdivision (1) of this rule, all requirements of
both provisions must be met for proffered outtfecrort statement to be admitted Although the
provisions an couched in slightly different

terms, both seek the same end — a determination that proffered out-of-court statements are
sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to be admitted State v Seale, 853 P2d 862 (Utah), cert
denied, 510 U S 865, 114 S Ct 186,126 L Ed
2d 145 (1993)
Construction.
This rule is permissive, not exclusive Nothing m the language of the rule can be fairly
construed to support the contention that other
methods to accomodate child witnesses are prohibited State v Hoyt, 806 P2d 204 (Utah Ct
App 1991)
Improper admission.
Admission of videotape of interview between
five-year-old victim and Division of Family Services worker was error because defendant was
unable to explore contradictory or confusing
portions of the victim's testimony, and prejudicial because the tape was the most damning
evidence presented at trial State v Lenaburg,
781 P2d 432 (Utah 1989)
Cited in State v Bullock, 791 P2d 155 (Utah
1989)
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Bnle 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefenctants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor t h a t tends to negate the guilt of the
^ u s e d , mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
°Sense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
*H>wn should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
^ q u a t e l v prepare his defense.
. &) The prosecutor shall m a k e all disclosures as soon as practicable follow^ the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
**°secutor h a s a continuing duty to make disclosure.
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(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places.
The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to
prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses
from harassment, abuse or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on
the further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological or medical reports.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order t h a t discovery
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, t h a t limitations on the further
dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court t h a t a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of
the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance
shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of t h e accused
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem
appropriate.
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment added the last sentence in Subdivision (e)
and "that limitations on the further dissemina-

tion of discovery be modified" in the first sentence of Subdivision (f).

